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SUMMARY 
 
The technique of aerial gamma-ray spectrometry has been applied 
to the search for a missing 74 GBq 
137
Cs source in the Niger 
Delta, Nigeria. Comparisons with a duplicate source confirm that 
an unshielded source of this type is readily detected at the 
normal survey height of 100m. It is also possible to detect the 
shielded source at closer range providing the survey altitude 
does not exceed about 50m. The detection of an unshielded source 
is very likely at the normal survey altitude of 100m. 
 
A survey of the populated zones of Warri and river routes to 
Otumara was conducted between 9
th
 and 19
th
 May 1991. The results 
demonstrate that the missing source was not present in this area 
in an unshielded form at this time. Signals likely to have been 
due to a shielded radiocaesium source were recorded. To date no 
source has been recovered, but investigations are continuing. 
 
High radiation readings were recorded over part of Forcados 
Village, on the banks of the Warri River. They are associated 
with a high Thorium/Uranium concentrated source. Ground level 
investigations are recommended to identify the origin of these 
signals and evaluate their potential radiological implications. 
 
If the missing source is not located by further ground based 
operations, it is suggested that consideration be given to 
remobilising a wider and more comprehensive aerial search. 
 
  
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This report describes an aerial survey conducted by SURRC on 
behalf of Atlas Wireline Services (AWS) and the Shell Petroleum 
Development Corporation of Nigeria with the aim of locating a 
missing 
137
Cs source in the Niger Delta. 
 
The source was part of an oil well logging density tool belonging 
to Atlas Wireline Services. It was stolen whilst within a  
transportation shield, along with other items, during or 
following transit between the Searex VI oil rig at Otumara and 
the Shell jetty at Warri between 4th and 7th April 1991.  
 
In view of the possible consequences of exposure or damage to 
the source AWS Safety Officer contacted SURRC on the 11th April 
to discuss the possibility of its detection by remote sensing. 
On the basis that an unshielded source is both readily detectable 
and represents a considerable hazard a decision was taken to 
mobilise an aerial search of the local area. An "emergency 
response" gamma spectrometry system was tested and shipped from 
East Kilbride on 16th April for this purpose. Although the 
shielded source is much less hazardous initial assessments were 
that under favourable circumstances even this might be detected.  
 
Once necessary innoculations and visas had been obtained - 
unfortunately a lengthy process - the SURRC search team travelled 
to Warri, arriving on 9th May, to start field operations.  
 
Initial aims were: 
 
a) to establish survey capability using available aircraft, in 
unmodified form, to demonstrate the detectability of a 
duplicate source both inside and outside its transport shield. 
 
b) to conduct a search of the Otumara-Warri transport route and 
the main populated areas in and around Warri in sufficient detail 
to identify any unshielded source which might be present. 
 
These tasks were all accomplished during the following 16 days. 
Results were obtained which suggest that the source was probably 
located in its transport shield at Dukungha village, south of the 
Warri port during the course of the survey.       
 
 
2. THE SOURCE 
 
The missing source consisted of 74 GBq (2 Ci) Cs. This 
radioisotope of caesium decays with a 30.2 year half life and is 
accompanied by the energetic emission of 662 keV gamma-rays. At 
the time of theft it was in a shielded transport container 
comprising of 35 kg lead, the lid secured by hasps and padlocks, 
and chained to a metal cage containing other items for shipment 
by barge from Otumara to Warri. Table 1 summarises the expected 
dose rates from both unshielded and shielded sources of this 
type, the latter being derived from measured dose rate values of 
the complete assembly. 
3 
 
 
Radiologically, the shielded assembly presents a modest hazard 
capable of exposing individuals within 2-3m of the source for 
long periods above the ICRP recommended annual limit for public 
exposure. Outside this range there would be little danger 
providing the source remains intact. If the shielding were 
damaged or removed, the source would represent a considerable 
hazard both to people in the immediate proximity - for whom there 
is a risk of acute effects developing as a result of protracted 
exposure - and to those in surrounding areas (of many tens of 
metres in distance) for which increased stochastic risks may be 
presented. If the source itself were damaged there is a potential 
contamination hazard with long term environmental implications. 
The physical form of the source however may go some way to 
mitigating these latter effects.  
 
Of these hazards it is evident that the radiation hazard 
associated with an unshielded source presents the greatest 
risk, and that the possibility of exposure of the source within 
a densely populated area is of most immediate concern. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Estimated Dose Rates from the Source. 
 
Condition  Distance /m   Dose Rate 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Shielded   1   25  μGy/hr 220 mGy/a 
by Transport 
Container   10   250 nGy/hr 2.2 mSv/a 
 
    100   2.5 nSv/hr 22 μSv/a 
 
 
Unshielded  1   8.7 mGy/hr 
 
    10   87  μGy/hr 
 
    100   870 nGy/hr 
 
Damaged   Partial radiation and contamination hazard 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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3. METHODS AND METHODOLOGIES. 
 
3.1 General 
 
Aerial radiometric techniques follow from the ability of high 
energy gamma rays to penetrate up to several hundred metres in 
air. High volume radiation detectors and ancillary equipment 
carried within a suitable aircraft can record variations of the 
terrestrial gamma-ray radiation field, in an extremely rapid and 
cost effective manner. Where quantitative data are required the 
system may be calibrated to estimate ground activities of natural 
and man-made radionuclides. This has been the basis of 
environmental surveys and mineral exploration over many years. 
Generally, only the surface layers of soil and rock are 
investigated due to attenuation of gamma-rays in these solid 
media. This is principally a function of ground composition and 
prevailing local physical conditions. Superficial radioactivity 
such as point sources or fallout nuclides deposited on the ground 
surface following nuclear accidents can be readily detected, 
although subsequent diffusion or migration through the upper 
layers of soil over a period of time will result in reductions 
of signal strength. Sources which retain their integrity may 
remain where deposited unless physically disturbed, and therefore 
can potentially be located and recovered. The ability to detect 
buried sources or those submerged in water is likewise related 
to depth and dilution factor in the case of encapsulation 
breakage. 
 
Aerial survey has a number of distinct advantages over ground 
based monitoring methods. The speed and economy with which 
effective large area searches can be conducted is considerably 
greater. Furthermore it may be logistically impossible to conduct 
an effective search at ground level, especially in emergency 
situations, or in difficult terrains. However, as the height of 
the detector increases, the field of view or the effective ground 
area examined increases, and the signal strength decreases. These 
response characteristics must be taken into account in 
interpreting the results of aerial surveys. In some cases ground 
based investigation of features identified from the air may be 
necessary to provide a full characterisation of local details. 
 
The environmental applications of the technique have been 
reviewed elsewhere [1]. The origins of aerial survey lie in its 
application to uranium prospecting [2], particularly of remote 
areas, some forty years ago. Environmental assessments of the 
releases of radioactive materials have been conducted efficiently 
and comprehensively following accidents like Chernobyl [3]. The 
search and recovery of fragments from a satellite nuclear reactor 
in North-West Canada was achieved successfully in 1978 [4]. 
 
SURRC has conducted a number of surveys over recent years, shown 
in table 2, following feasibility work on constructing of 
suitable equipment and its implementation in a variety of 
applications. An active research programme is also underway to 
improve knowledge of the response of airborne detectors. 
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Table 2. 
 
Environmental Aerial Surveys Conducted by SURRC. 
 
Location    Date    Detector  Flying  Aircraft  
   volume    time   type 
   /litres   /hrs 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Whithorn,   Feb.1988   7  5 Cessna  
Mull of Galloway,        Titan 
SE Scotland  
 
North & South Uist,  Mar.1988   7  5 Cessna 
Benbecula,          Titan 
West. Isles [4]  
 
West Cumbria [5]  Aug.1988  7  36 Bell 
          Jetranger 
 
Upper Clyde  Dec.1988  7  2 Aérospatiale 
 Valley,            Squirrel 
SW Scotland  
 
Central Highlands  Dec.1988  7  5 Aérospatiale 
            Squirrel 
 
Eaglesham Moor,  Jan.1989  7  1 Aérospatiale 
SW Scotland           Squirrel 
 
North Wales [6]  Jul.1989  20  20 Aérospatiale 
            Squirrel 
 
Southwest England  Sep.1989  24  51 Aérospatiale 
            Squirrel 
 
Ayrshire and Arran Jul.1990  16  45 Aérospatiale 
 [7]            Squirrel 
 
Sellafield,   Sept.1990  8  6 Aérospatiale 
Cumbria           approx.  Squirrel 
  
Aerial Surveys for Lost Sources conducted by SURRC  
 
Forth Estuary,  Dec.1988  7    Not Aérospatiale 
Grangemouth       published   Squirrel 
Nr. Edinburgh  
[8]  
 
Comment. A search for a lost 6.22 GBq 
137
Cs source. 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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3.2 The Aerial Survey of the Niger Delta 
 
Prior to departure from the UK information regarding various 
operational details was ascertained as far as communications 
allowed. Although aircraft type could not be confirmed before 
departure the spectrometry equipment was selected for flexibility 
of installation, the intention being to adapt the precise 
recording methods and installation to suit local conditions. 
 
Avionic capability for routine surveys includes radioaltimetry, 
with analogue output to provide a continuous record of survey 
height, and navigational instrumentation to provide on-line 
positional information in latitude and longitude. Cabin cooling 
is regarded as a pre-requisite for surveys in tropical regions 
with delicate and sensitive equipment. 
 
It became apparent upon our arrival that, despite contrary 
expectations, the aircraft available were not fully equipped to 
routine survey standards. After further enquiries by Atlas 
Wireline Services into the availability of suitably instrumented 
aircraft for dedicated use it was decided to persevere with the 
Bristows Bell 212 helicopters used for personnel transport by 
Shell, for the first phase of the aerial search. This introduced 
a number of operational constraints; namely lack of navigational 
equipment, high cabin temperatures (up to 37°C on one occasion), 
and limited and sporadic availability due to a high workload for 
the primary task. 
 
Adaptions to both equipment and survey methodology were needed 
to accommodate such constraints. The navigational problem was 
dealt with in a straightforward though time consuming manner. 
Shell Security and Petroleum Engineering Divisions respectively 
obtained detailed maps of Warri and the surrounding delta areas. 
Flight paths were constrained as far as possible to straight line 
sections flown at constant height and speed. End points and times 
were marked on the appropriate maps during each flight and 
positions for each spectral observation calculated by 
interpolation during post flight data analysis. This technique 
worked satisfactorily within limits but introduced a considerable 
analytical burden, with consequent delays, to data processing. 
Radioaltimetry data were available intermittently on one of the 
Bristows Bell 212 (QV) helicopters, and this aircraft was used, 
subject to its other commitments. 
 
The high cabin temperatures caused initial instrumental problems. 
Although the spectrometer worked fully in the air conditioned AWS 
workshop from the beginning, it was unable to sustain extended 
operation at ambient temperatures. A sequence of tests and 
modifications was immediately implemented to extend the 
operational period at high temperatures. Elimination of 
duplicated or unnecessary components rapidly extended the cycle 
time to one hour. Sustained operation was eventually achieved by 
increasing the ventilation of the logging computer and fitting 
two auxiliary cooling fans. The assistance of Grant Ireland in 
the Bristows Avionics section is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Despite these technical difficulties, and the rapid 
acclimatisation of the SURRC team, the system was made 
operational and used to investigate the built up parts of Warri, 
outlying villages and the transportation route to Otumara. Warri 
was surveyed in roughly parallel lines avoiding hazardous or 
sensitive areas (Army Barracks, aerial masts, tall industrial 
plant, etc) at the discretion of the pilot. The outer lying 
villages were treated in a similar manner, depending upon size. 
The transportation waterways were searched by flying the contours 
of both sides of the river banks. Roughly 2600 gamma ray spectra 
were recorded, mapped and analysed from these areas. 
 
Plate 1 shows the equipment mounted within the Bristow Bell 212 
helicopter, (Plate 2). Plate 3 is a view of Warri at survey 
altitude, nominally 75m. 
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4. FIELD OPERATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
A brief chronological account of the fieldwork is shown in Table 
3. 
 
Table 3. Chronological Account of Fieldwork.  
 Date  Diary  
___________________________________________________________________ 
9/5/91 Thursday  Arrival of SURRC team in Warri. 
Equipment un-packed and tested in 
air-conditioned lab., at AWS yard.  
 
10/5/91 Friday  Meeting at Shell Security. 6 hours of 
flight time allocated. Swim test. First 
test flight. Overheating problems of 
equipment become apparent. Work to 
solve problems begins in Avionics Bay, 
Bristow Helicopters.  
 
11/5/91 Saturday  Work all day on equipment. Ground tests 
using a duplicate shielded 
137
Cs 
source. 
 
12/5/91 Sunday  Second flight. Faulty H.V. lead delays 
spectrometer installation. Flight 
commences with hand-held monitors, over 
S. Warri. Survey equipment installed 
for third flight. Continuous operation 
for first hour, until overheating 
occurs once more. Cooling fans 
installed.  
 
13/5/91 Monday  Equipment tested and found to be 
functioning correctly. Spectral data 
and flight path recovery processing.  
 
14/5/91 Tuesday  Meeting to review progress and plan 
further action. Afternoon flight to 
Otumara via Warri River & creeks. 
Burutu surveyed. Anomally observed over 
Forcados. Unshielded source at AWS yard 
overflown. S. Warri town, Orugbo, Ode-
Itsekiri & Ogunu villages surveyed. 
Later village to west of Gulf jetty, 2 
villages at Amadano Creek, N. Warri and 
area west of Ogunu flown.  
 
15/5/91 Wednesday  Equipment checked & OK.  
 
16/5/91 Thursday  Data analysis. No further flights 
booked.  
 
17/5/91 Friday  Equipment checked & OK. Further 6 
hours of flying agreed.  
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Table 3 (Cont) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
18/5/91 Saturday  Warri, Jones Creek & Rivers surveyed. 
Forcados revisited. Forcados exhibits 
localised and potentially hazardous 
radiation source. 
 
19/5/91 Sunday  Warri completed. Shielded source over 
AWS yard repeated. Agbarho flown. 
Transportation routes completed. 
Outlying villages around Warri flown. 
Dukungha Village revisited. Data 
interpretation and discussion of 
Dukungha measurements carried to late 
evening. 
 
20/5/91 Monday  Meeting at Shell with PEDW. Sufficient 
evidence to warrant a coordinated 
operation to attempt to recover the 
source. Signal over Dukungha no longer 
detectable. Operation called off. 
 
21/5/91-22/5/91  Further data analysis and flight track 
reconstruction. Preparation of 
condensed summary of findings. 
 
23/5/91 Thursday  Meeting with TEMW. All results 
discussed. Ground investigations to be 
intensified. Further aerial surveys 
suspended until these investigations 
have been carried out. 
 
24/5/91 Friday  SURRC team return to UK. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.1 Duplicate Source Tests 
 
In order to have a clear impression of the likely strength of 
signals to be expected from a shielded and unshielded 
137
Cs 
source, of similar activity to the one lost, a number of 
experiments were performed with a duplicate: 
 
a) Ground tests were made with the shielded source placed at 
known distances from the detector array: the source remained 
detectable to a distance of approximately 50m, despite enhanced 
ground contributions from terrestrial gamma-rays. The spectra 
from some of these tests are shown in figures 1, 2 and 3, for 
source-detector distances of 20m, 45m and 81m respectively. 
 
b) Airborne tests made with the shielded and unshielded source 
over the AWS yard. Figure 4 shows the unshielded source at normal 
survey altitude (approx. 100m) and about 70 knots flying speed. 
Figure 5 shows the corresponding shielded source at 50m altitude, 
recorded on 19/5/91 at slow speed. 
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Overall the detectability of the source was well confirmed by 
these tests. Line spacing of 200-300m and flight speed of 70-80 
knots provide total coverage for detection of an unshielded 
source. Detector sensitivity is sufficient to give immediate and 
unambiguous indication of such a signal. A shielded source is 
also detectable although closer flight lines, lower survey speed 
and preferably lower altitude are needed to conduct high density 
search for such an item. Additionally the signals associated with 
shielded sources must be extracted by spectral stripping to 
subtract the background signals due natural radiation sources. 
 
4.2 Aerial Survey of Warri and the Transportation Routes 
 
Priority was given to the aerial survey of Warri, to eliminate 
the possibility of an unshielded source in such a densely 
populated area. The most important finding was that no such 
signal was detected (except during the brief and deliberate 
exposure of the duplicate source at AWS to confirm 
detectability). 
 
There was some doubt as to the exact transportation route taken 
between Searex VI and the Shell jetty. Therefore the most likely 
routes were eliminated in a systematic way, bearing in mind 
flying time available (helicopter duration was approx. 2-2.5 
hours), distances involved and pockets of habitation whose past 
reputation had been raised by Shell security. 
 
A strong signal was observed over Forcados village (map 
reference: 5'21.59 lat. 5'26.7 long.). Subsequent analysis showed 
this to be due to a Uranium/Thorium source of unusually high 
concentration. The spectral data, shown in figure 6, records 
decay products of these parent radionuclides by measuring 
214
Bi (a 
daughter of 
238
U) and 
208
Tl (a daughter of 
232
Th) at 1764 keV and 
2615 keV respectively. Apparently this source may be due to a 
"spectrolog calibrator" and certainly requires further ground 
investigations and removal. For comparison a second spectrum is 
plotted in figure 6, recorded approximately 30 seconds after the 
peak Forcados signal, indicating the change in signal 
experienced. Table 5 shows the flight transect over the peak 
signal in terms of stripped 
208
Tl count-rate (true count-rate and 
interference free). The total gamma radiation count rate was 
elevated by up to 50 times the ambient level over the centre 
point of this object. At even closer proximity higher levels 
still are expected. 
 
The Delta steel works in Warri produced a signal which is thought 
to mainly originate from the natural series (probably slag 
enhancing refractory nuclides). However on spectral 
deconvolution, a residual radiocaesium signal was also 
(equivalent to a shielded source in strength) observed. The 
possibility that radioactivity has been inadvertently 
incorporated into scrap metal should not be overlooked; indeed 
there are precedents for this in other parts of the world. 
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Table 4. Line transect taken over Forcados village, showing 
stripped 
208
Tl and including the peak signal.  
  
Date  Time  Filename  Latitude  Longitude  
208
Tl   
          /cps  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18/5/91  15:31:28  WAR18006B  5'21.68  5'26.3  11. 5   
  15:31:42  WAR18007A  5'21.8  5'26.35  50.7  
  15:31:56  WAR18007B  5'21.8  5'26.45  73.5  
  15:32:12  WAR18008A  5'21.8  5'26.55  46.9  
  15:32:25  WAR18008B  5'21.8  5'26.26  44.8  
  15:32:39  WAR18009A  5'21.76  5'26.7  67.4  
  15:32:53  WAR18009B  5'21.68  5'26.7  118.2   
  15:33:07  WAR18010A  5'21.59  5'26.7  163.8   
  15:33:22  WAR18010B  5'21.51  5'26.7  91.5  
  15:33:36  WAR18011A  5'21.43  5'26.7  32.4  
  15:33:49  WAR18011B  5'21.34  5'26.7  11.8  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Low intensity anomalies were recorded close to the Schlumberger 
yard, within Warri market and Dunkungha village. These were 
attributed to radiocaesium on spectral grounds. In the first, the 
navigational reconstruction actually placed the anomaly directly 
across the river from the logging company's premises. This may 
have highlighted the limitations of mapping position by fiducial 
markers and interpolation. The chance interception of sources 
belonging to other logging operators and being in transit was 
considered and steps were taken by Shell to identify the 
locations of such legitimate sources. 
 
Of the second anomalous signal, initial spectral stripping 
revealed a weaker signal strength than that corresponding to a 
shielded source, but slightly above the average measurements 
recorded up to that point. A working estimate of minimum 
detectable level suggested that these signals carried marginal 
statistical significance. A brief ground level investigation of 
the market by the AWS Safety Engineer and a plain clothes 
policeman confirmed this interpretation. 
 
The third signal over Dukungha village represented a signal of 
strength between the above second outlier and a shielded source. 
This was reported to the meeting on Thursday 16/5/91. Because of 
its relative isolation, an investigation by boat was necessary. 
 
During the Saturday (18/5/91) and Sunday (19/5/91) further 
flights were made to complete Warri, the peripheral villages and 
waterway routes. On late Sunday evening, Dukungha village was 
revisited for the third time and anomalous caesium signals re-
affirmed. Figure 7 shows the anomalous signal (c.f. figure 5) and 
figure 8, the spectrum taken during an interval 10 seconds later. 
 
On the basis of this, a meeting was called early Monday morning, 
20/5/91, and subsequent events are recorded in section 4.3. 
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The distribution of stripped count-rate 
137
Cs encountered 
throughout the whole survey period is shown in figure 9. The 
Dukungha village feature is the only unexplained anomaly, well 
to the right of the general distribution.  
 
The maps in the final figures show the stripped 
137
Cs count-rate 
variation over the entire survey area and Warri. The results from 
the duplicate source tests have been omitted. 
  
Table 5 shows the values of 
137
Cs stripped count-rate recorded 
over the indicated sites. 
 
Table 5. 
137
Cs stripped Count-rate. 
 
 
  Site    Date  
137
Cs  Filename 
        / cps 
_________________________________________________________ 
AWS Shielded Source   12/5/91 23.7  WAR01027 
AWS Unshielded Source  13/5/91 1871  WAR10012 
Dukungha Village   14/5/91 10.9  WAR11059 
Dukungha Village   18/5/91 17.1  WAR19012 
Dukungha Village   19/5/91 17.6  WAR23105 
Delta Steel Plant  19/5/91 13.6  WAR21079 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.3 Rescue Operation, Monday 20/5/91 
 
Careful spectral analysis of the weekend flying operation was 
sufficiently convincing, both in terms of signal strength that 
might be expected from a shielded source (either in a transport 
container or buried beneath ground/water) and characteristic 
gamma-ray energy, that a meeting was called on Monday, 20/5/91. 
The proximity of Dukungha Village to the Shell jetty (one of the 
likely places for the theft to have occurred) and its relative 
isolation, gave extra circumstantial credence to the findings. 
 
A full briefing between those concerned and the AWS Safety 
Engineer (who would be supervising the ground operation), was 
made to ensure radiological safety and to define appropriate 
countermeasures in the event of finding a breached source 
container. 
 
A co-ordinated air-ground operation, facilitated by walky-talky 
communication, commenced in the late afternoon and was led by the 
survey helicopter. Three seatrucks of 12 policemen (5 armed) 
stood close-by in the Warri River. Diving crews had been alerted 
to the possibility of a water recovery operation. However, the 
survey equipment could not positively identify the signal, 
despite flying at half the survey height (approx. 30m) and much 
slower (less than 50 knots). The complete area was repeatedly 
swept four times. 
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Without positive location from the helicopter it was not possible 
to guide ground teams directly to the house or houses from which 
the Cs signal had been detected beforehand. 
 
since the signals had been clearly present on all three previous 
overflights of Dukungha, it can be inferred that the Cs source 
had either been moved or covered between Sunday 19/5/91 and 
Monday 1700 hours 20/5/91. 
 
Subsequent re-examination of the spectral evidence back at SURRC 
in June 1991 has reinforced the positive nature of the evidence. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The following conclusions may be drawn from this experience. 
 
  1) The capabilities of aerial surveys to detect missing source 
of this sort were confirmed, and also the adaptability of 
appropriate equipment to the field conditions which occur in 
remote oil locations. 
 
  2) It was clearly demonstrated that no unshielded source hazard 
was present in the survey area at the time of the survey. 
 
  3) The shielded source was, and is, detectable. A total survey 
for the shielded source would be possible, however but 50m line 
spacing and 30-50m altitude would be needed for complete 
coverage. 
 
  4) The Dukungha signals have all the required features of the 
shielded source. The location of the site, and the fact that the 
source had been moved only add to suspicions that this was in 
fact the missing source. 
 
  5) We recommend that further investigations (at ground level) 
focus on Dukungha and that if this fails consideration be given 
to remobilising a wider survey. 
   
  6) It is suggested that contingency plans be laid for more rapid 
mobilisation to oil fields in case of similar future incidents. 
 
  7) The use of dedicated aircraft, more rapid ground based 
investigation of anomalies, and a more discrete operation may 
have a greater chance of success. This is particularly important 
under the unusual situation that sources may be being held to 
ransom by individuals who are aware of what they have. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Equipment Inventory  
 
 
8 litre detector array  
 
286 PC computer with:  GPS prototype navigational system  
     Rad-alt ADC card  
     2 MCB cards  
     EGA LCD display  
     display power supply  
     keyboard  
 
Detector power supplies  
 
4 AC Delco sealed batteries (2 back-ups)  
 
DC/AC power inverters+cables from helicopter supply  
 
Battery charger (24v)  
 
GPS Navsat antenna+cable (aircraft antenna unavailable)  
 
LC10 printer+paper  
 
Full set of necessary cables  
 
Long extension lead  
 
Computer anti-vibration pad  
 
Accessories  
Spare summing amplifier and distribution board  
 
Spare mains inverter (RS)  
 
Spare cables  
 
Tools:  portable soldering iron  
  solder  
  screwdrivers (flat and cross-head)  
  snips  
  small voltmeter  
 
Insulation tape  
 
Spare discs+tapes  
 
Back-up discs (system discs, "AERO" & "MCA26/MCA27" programs)  
 
Bungee cords, spare fuses and connectors 
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Plate 1. Installation of aerial survey equipment. 
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Plate 2. Aerial survey helicopter: Bristow Bell 212. 
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Plate 3. Warri, Nigeria. 
  
19 
 
 
 
 
 
  
20 
 
 
 
  
21 
 
 
 
  
22 
 
 
  
23 
 
 
  
24 
 
 
  
25 
 
 
  
26 
 
 
  
27 
 
 
  
28 
 
 
 
 
 
  
29 
 
 
 
            
    
